Redesigning School Governance: Beyond Mayoral Control

From time to time the legislature passes a bill with a sunset provision, unless the law is reauthorized by a specific date the law reverts to the law it replaced, the mayoral control section of the New York City school governance law sunsets on June 30h, 2024.

In 2022 in the waning days of the session the legislators, led by John Liu, the chair of the NYC Education Subcommittee made a number of changes to the mayoral control law (Read link below), the major change, increasing the size to an unwieldy 22 members, however the majority of the members remain appointees of the mayor (Read the law here)

There is a major misconception, the Board does not create policy, the Board “approves” policy set by the chancellor who is selected by the mayor, not the Board.

2590-h. Powers and duties of chancellor.  The office of chancellor  of the city district is hereby continued. Such chancellor shall serve at the pleasure of and be employed by the mayor of the city of New York by contract.  The composition and duties of the Board are explicitly set forth in the law. Powers and duties of the city board. The city board shall  advise the chancellor on matters of policy affecting the welfare of the city school district and its pupils.  The board shall exercise no executive power and perform no executive or administrative functions.  Nothing  herein contained shall be construed to require or authorize the  day-to-day supervision or the administration of the  operations  of  any  school  within  the  city  school  district of the city of New York

Sections (a) through (h) directs the Board to “approve” or “consider and approve” actions of the chancellor, the Board has “no executive power.”  (See section the law here)

If the legislature takes no action by the end of June the current mayoral control law sunsets to the prior law,

The governance structure would sunset to the prior law,

2590-b. Continuation of city board and establishment of community districts. 1. (a) the board of education of the city school district of the city of New York is hereby continued. Such board of education shall consist of seven members, a member to be appointed by each borough president of the city of New York and two by the mayor. Each borough president appointee shall be a resident of the borough for which the borough president appointing him was elected. Two members at large shall be appointed by the mayor of the city of New York. Each mayoral appointee shall be a resident of such city. The term of office of each ember shall be four years,

In 2019 the state legislature held hearings on the reauthorization of the mayor control law,

Diane Ravitch’s testimony.

First, the independent Board of Education that existed in the law prior to 2002 should be restored. The mayor should have appointees on that board, but so should the borough presidents, the Comptroller, and the President of the City Council. There should also be seats for independent citizens who are recommended by a screening panel made up of civic groups, civil rights groups, and groups that advocate for educational equity. The independent Board of Education, not the mayor, should appoint the Chancellor and the Chancellor should answer to the Board, not the mayor

I also testified before the committee and emphasized an elected Board would could result in untold charter school dollars dominating the electoral process. The Citizens United. Supreme Court decision; dollars in elections are “speech and protected by the First Amendment. Read here

and my testimony below

In the hotly contested Denver School Board election the pro-charter, pro-choice “dark money” organizations are outspending the Denver Teachers Association 10 to 1

Norm Fruchter, in a brilliant blog post at the NYU Metro Center encapsulates the conundrum.

The problem is not simply how to equitably frame the mayor’s ability to govern the city’s education system. In all our city’s public service bureaucracies, the interests and needs of users and stakeholders are not represented or structured into useful forms of participation. Because the schooling of the city’s students matters so intensely to students, their families, teachers and administrators, education policy issues will always be intensely contested.

What we need are new participatory structures to engage and integrate that contestation and shape more representative and equitable policy solutions

How do we define “new participatory structures”?

Next blog: Is the NYC Department of Education Too Big to Succeed?

One response to “Redesigning School Governance: Beyond Mayoral Control

  1. Eric Nadelstern

    Because mayors influence a significant portion of tax levy funding of schools, they always had control. Remember when Rudy Giuliani forced Chancellor Ray Cortinez to trim the staff at the central office by thousands of positions?

    Mayoral Control isn’t about control at all. It’s about mayoral accountability. Without accountability, mayors can exercise influence for political gain rather than to improve student performance as when Ed Koch packed the central office with over 600 mayoral appointees, necessitating the creation of Education Administrator (EA) line positions.

    Returning to an unaccountable Board of Education will neither benefit schools nor raise student achievement. It would, however, lead to greater opportunity for political patronage snd corruption.

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